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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

accretion rather than avulsion. Avulsion would have allowed White to
retain ownership. Accretion involved "a slow and gradual addition or
building up of lands due to the deposit of sediment eroded from upstream
lands." Whereas, avulsion involved "a sudden and rapid disruption of a
piece of ground due to the change in the course of a river."
The Arkansas Court of Appeals agreed with White that summary
judgment was not proper because material questions of fact existed about
the nature of the changes in the disputed land. The court noted that when a
stream changed its course by accretion rather than avulsion, the boundaries
of the riparian landowners changed with the stream. The court expressed
concern that Hamlen's exhibits contained a substantial gap of time not
documented, that they were merely illustrative of intermittent moments,
and did not conclusively prove that the land change was gradual, especially
in light of the government's river project in 1966. In addition, the court
held that a genuine issue of fact also existed regarding White's second
argument invoking an Arkansas statute. This statute would vest title to the
disputed land depending on whether the land formation was an island or
sandbar, a determination not clear from Hamlen's exhibits. Thus, the
court reversed the summary judgment ruling and remanded the case.
Several judges dissented from the majority opinion. The dissenting
opinion stated that the summary judgment order should have been upheld
because White submitted a deficient abstract to the court according to
procedural rules, and did not create a genuine issue of material fact in
response to Hamlen's prima facie case.
Vanessa L. Condra
CALIFORNIA
County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency, 91 Cal. Rptr.
2d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an environmental impact report
("EIR") based upon an unadopted, draft general plan that did not
adequately describe the baseline environment was insufficient, thus
affirming the trial court's order to set aside approval of the EIR for the El
Dorado Project, as well as its findings of fact and statements of overriding
concerns).
The defendants, the El Dorado County Water Agency ("Water
Agency"), and the El Dorado Irrigation District ("Irrigation District"),
created a two-part strategy to meet water demands of the area's growing
population. The first prong of this plan, the El Dorado Project, diverted
17,000 acre feet of water per year from three high Sierra lakes for
consumptive use. The Water Agency and the Irrigation District jointly
prepared an environmental impact report ("EIR") and certified it as
complying with the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA").
However, the need for new water supplies described in the EIR had been
based upon a draft, unadopted general growth plan for the area.
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The second aspect of the defendants' strategy required the Irrigation
District to purchase a hydroelectric dam, known as Project 184, from the
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E). The agencies planned to shift
the dam's focus from electricity generation to supplying consumptive water
demands. The Irrigation District concluded that this agency action was
exempt from CEQA requirements. Therefore, an EIR for this action was
not necessary.
The California Department of Fish and Game, Amador County, and
the League to Save the Sierra Lakes (collectively "coalition") challenged
the agencies' decisions concerning the El Dorado Project and Project 184.
The trial court ruled for the coalition, concluding the EIR for the El
Dorado Project was inadequate, and Project 184 was not exempt from
CEQA requirements. The agencies appealed, contending that El Dorado
County's and State Water Resources Control Board's ("SWRCB") actions
before the trial court's decision mooted many of the concerns. In addition,
the agencies claimed that the EIRs for the El Dorado project were
adequate. Finally, the agencies asserted that Project 184 was exempt from
CEQA because state CEQA claims were preempted by the Federal Power
Act, the plaintiffs' claims against Project 184 were barred by the statute of
limitations, and that Project 184 was categorically exempt from CEQA.
The agencies stated that the coalition's claims were moot for two
reasons. First, El Dorado County approved the general growth plan
subsequent to the EIR. Thus, the agencies argued the coalition's challenge
to the El Dorado Project EIRs was moot. The court, however, disagreed.
The court concluded that this issue was not moot because the Sacramento
County Superior Court had previously invalidated the general plan as
inadequate and ordered a redraft. In addition, the court stressed that
another entity's subsequent determinations are irrelevant when considering
whether a lead state agency complied with CEQA.
The agencies' second mootness argument focused on whether
SWRCB's decision D-1635 mooted the issue that the EIRs did not
adequately address the impacts on the lake levels and fishery resources. D1635 imposed conditions relating to water flows and lake levels. The
agencies maintained that the decision provided the requisite impacts and
mitigation analysis for the EIRs. However, the Court of Appeals noted
that SWRCB had withdrawn D-1635 for reconsideration. Therefore, the
court concluded that D-1635 did not moot this issue.
The court next considered whether defendants abused their
discretion by basing the EIR on a draft general plan. The court determined
that an EIR based upon a projection of population growth and subsequent
water demand that has not been approved was an abuse of the CEQA
process. In addition, the Court of Appeals gave weight to the fact that the
general plan had been judicially deemed to be lacking. Therefore, the
Court of Appeals concluded that an EIR, predicated on a draft general
plan, was fundamentally flawed and inadequate.
In addition, the court affirmed the trial court's determination that the
EIRs did not adequately describe the baseline environment of the source of
the water, the high Sierra lakes, and PG& E's historic operations of those
lakes. This information was necessary in an EIR to compare the affected
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area's environment before and after the agency takes action. The agencies
used prior, end of the month, lake water levels and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's regulations for Project 184 to describe the
baseline environment and the historic operations. The court stated the
agencies' baseline environment description was a historical description, not
an operational analysis. Thus, the court concluded the description was
insufficient to compare the effects of a diversion of 17,000 acre-feet per
year from the affected lakes.
The court next considered whether the Federal Power Act ("FPA")
preempted the CEQA, thus rendering the Irrigation District's action
exempt from CEQA. The court recognized that the FPA regulated
hydroelectric power facilities such as Project 184, and that state law was
preempted to the extent that it conflicted with the FPA. However, the
court also noted that the FPA contained a savings clause, expressly stating
that the FPA was not to interfere or affect "the laws of the respective
States relating to the control, appropriation, use or distribution of water
used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right
acquired therein." The court decided that this savings clause applied only
if Project 184 affected proprietary water rights. The agencies claimed that
there were no such rights at issue. Conversely, the court stated that water
consumption, and its removal from a stream bed, substantially affected
proprietary water rights. Therefore, the court concluded that the savings
clause applied to the agencies' employing Project 184 for consumptive
water purposes, and the FPA did not preempt this action.
The court then determined whether the coalition timely challenged
the agencies' actions within the statute of limitations. A party must file a
challenge to agency's notice of exemption from CEQA within thirty-five
days of the agency's filing of the notice. The Irrigation District filed for
exemption in April 1995. The plaintiffs challenged the action in September
1995 when the agency took steps to actually acquire Project 184.
However, the court stated that a notice of exemption was invalid if the
agency did not officially approve the action first. The court further
concluded that the official approval by the Irrigation District for Project
Therefore, the plaintiffs'
184 did not come until September 1995.
challenge was timely and did not violate the statute of limitations.
Finally, the court determined whether the proposed use of Project
184 fit within one of the two categorical exceptions to CEQA. The first
consideration involved the "existing facilities" exception. The court stated
that the key consideration concerning this exception was whether the
agency action involved a negligible or non-expansion of a facility's existing
use. The court concluded that a shift from a hydropower focus to a
consumptive use of the water was not a negligible expansion of Project
184's use.
The court next considered the "ongoing project" exception. This
exception excluded any project from CEQA that had been operating prior
to April 5, 1973. The court concluded that this exception did not apply to
Project 184 because the change from nonconsumptive use to consumptive
use expanded the project beyond its original purpose. Therefore, the court
resolved that employing Project 184 for a consumptive use was not
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categorically exempt from CEQA. Consequently, the court affirmed the
trial court's decision in favor of the coalition. In addition, the coalition
received costs for the appeal.
Kirk Waible

COLORADO
Municipal Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. OXY USA,
Inc., 990 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1999) (holding Colorado's can and will and
anti-speculation doctrines, in addition to the reasonable diligence
requirement, apply to hexennial reviews of conditional water right
applications).
OXY USA, Inc. ("OXY") filed a hexennial review application in 1995
to maintain its conditional water rights in Garfield County. The Municipal
Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Subdistrict")
objected, arguing that OXY had failed to diligently develop its conditional
rights, thus, had abandoned those rights. The water court found that OXY
had met the reasonable diligence requirement necessary to maintain its
conditional rights. The Subdistrict appealed. The Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed the water court's decision.
OXY owned over ten thousand acres of land in Garfield County that
contained large oil shale reserves. OXY held a conditional water right
decree for the future extraction of oil shale.
OXY obtained these
conditional rights when it purchased Cities Service Company. Cities
Service Company initiated the conditional rights in 1951 and 1966,
obtaining a decree in 1970. The extraction of oil shale at the time of this
decision was economically infeasible due to low oil prices.
To meet the reasonable diligence requirement, OXY asserted that it
spent $5,052,235.00 on its oil shale project during the prior six years. The
costs included money spent drilling four natural gas wells, performing
technological and economic feasibility studies, soliciting financial partners,
participating in multiple Colorado River Projects and related resource
extraction associations, and gathering water supply data. OXY incurred
other expenses, such as paying salaries, engineering fees, legal fees, and
litigation costs to protect its water rights. In light of this evidence, the
water court found that OXY was able to show that it was diligently
developing its conditional water rights to eventual maturity.
Applying its recent Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado
Conservancy District v. Chevron Shale Oil Co. standard which allowed
water courts to make ad hoc factual findings based on project specific
factors surrounding the development of an appropriation in diligence
proceedings, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the water court's
decree. The court held that it was proper for the water court to weigh all
relevant evidence, including economic conditions beyond the applicant's
control, in hexennial reviews for reasonable diligence. The court said that

